**The Moon Jae-in Government’s Foreign Relations/National Security Policy and THAAD**

**1. The advent of the Moon Jae-in administration and its attitude towards THAAD**

- June 30, 2017, President Moon Jae-in: (Referring to the Department of Defense’s failure to report having brought in additional THAAD launchers and the incomplete environmental impact assessment) “The ROK government’s discussion about the deployment of THAAD is in relation to procedures that will guarantee democratic legitimacy and procedural transparency.”

“Any concerns that the ROK government seeks to reverse the deployment of THAAD can be put aside.”

- June 9, 2017, Chief of the National Security Office Chung Eui-yong: “The environmental impact assessment may take longer than expected.” He also mentioned THAAD being primarily useful for defending the US Forces stationed in Korea (USFK).

- June 7, 2017, Moon Chung-in, Presidential Advisor: “The environmental impact assessment should take one year. There is no chance of cancelling the agreement on the deployment of THAAD.”

 - July 2017: referring to the US-ROK agreement on deployment of THAAD, “We will uphold our agreement, but it is necessary to carry out the environmental impact assessment in accordance with national law. According to the results of the assessment, we could continue the deployment or change the location or the base. It is hard to say ahead of time.”

- July 6, 2017, Vice Defense Minister Seo Joo-seok: “The deployment of THAAD is illegal, but it will be difficult to go back on the agreement between the US and the ROK.”

- Environmental impact assessment: May take over a year.

- Government treats the deployment of THAAD almost as a given fact. It is Difficult to overcome the grip of the U.S.-ROK alliance.

- Moon Jae-in’s supporters are actively putting forth a pro-THAAD stance, swaying public opinion negatively.

- Public Opinion Trends

Pro THAAD 53.6% : Anti THAAD 36.3% (August 16, 2016 Asan Policy Institute)

Pro 51% : Anti 40% (January 1, 2017, Gallup)

Pro 48.4% : Against 36. 7% (May 2, 2017 MBN)

Pro 39. 9% : Should reconsider 56.1% (May 17, 2017, Hankoyreh)

Pro 57% : Against 27% (July 7 2017, Gallup)

**2. ROK-US Combined Forces 4D strategy and kill chain, Korean Air and Missile Defense**

- June 20, 2017 US-ROK Joint Statement mentioning strengthening of the 4D strategy

“The ROK will continue to acquire the critical military capabilities necessary to lead the combined defense, and detect, disrupt, destroy, and defend against North Korean nuclear and missile threats, including through interoperable Kill-Chain, Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), and other Alliance systems.”

- Implications of strengthening of 4D strategy: The ROK government will continue to introduce US MD weapons systems such as THAAD, SM-3, etc.

 - Continuation of the Obama administration’s preemptive strike strategy of ‘detect, disrupt, destroy and defend.’

- Meaning of strengthening the Kill Chain and KAMD: Building up military strength based on the concept of preemptive strike at even the sign of a North Korean missile test.

**3. Effectiveness of THAAD against North Korean ballistic missile**

- In a word, THAAD is useless due to:

 - Geographical characteristics of the Korean Peninsula

 - Lack of ability to distinguish between real and fake warhead

 - Lack of ability to intercept a ballistic missile that is somersaulting or spiraling

 - Easily outmaneuvered by avoidance tactics

- Can’t respond to salvo (attack by multiple missiles)

**4. Legal Problems regarding the deployment of THAAD in South Korea**

- The US and ROK military authorities’ grounds for THAAD deployment

 - 2 reports of the US-ROK Joint Working Group on THAAD operation

 - July 8, 2016, US-ROK Joint Press Statement

 “The ROK and the United States made an Alliance decision to deploy THAAD to USFK as a defensive measure to ensure the security of the ROK and its people, and to protect Alliance military forces from North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile threats.”

- Legal Problems: As the issue falls outside the parameters of the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), it is not legally possible to deploy THAAD without concluding a separate treaty

 - The fact that the agreement was pursued in secret demonstrates recognition that deployment of THAAD is not possible based on the Mutual Defense Treaty or SOFA.

 - The agreement between US and ROK military authorities on the deployment of THAAD does not have the status of a treaty, a contract between official entities or even a gentlemen’s agreement.

**5. The U.S. objectives in deploying THAAD**

- The U.S.’ main goal has to do with its desire to neutralize China’s ICBM capacity and change its ‘strategic security’ to ultimate military superiority vis a vi China

- Goal of formation of a combined U.S.-ROK-JAPAN missile defense system and a 3-way military alliance.

“An integrated BMD network might be the forerunner of more institutionalized collective security in the region...” (Congressional Research Service, Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition.’ April 3, 2015.

**6. The New Cold War in East Asia and the continued delay of peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula**

* Cold War characteristics

 - U.S. strategy of containing China and blockading North Korea

 - Exceeding cold war conflict in term of both strategy and military force

 - Possibility that Korea will be the second target of a nuclear strike

 - Peacefully reunification of the Korean Peninsula appears far off

**7. North-South, U.S.-North Korea dialogue and the process for dismantling the cold war system**

- May 3, 2017, Trump administration’s ‘4 Nos’: No to regime change, collapse of the regime, accelerated artificial unification, penetration North of the 38th parallel

- June 30, 2017, President Moon’s ‘4 Nos’: No policy of hostility towards North Korea, militarized attack, regime change or facilitating of regime collapse, accelerated artificial unification

**8. New Berlin Declaration (Berlin Peace Initiative), [proposal for North-South military talks**

- July 6, 2017, Berlin Peace Plan

 - 5 point policy plan: 1. Carrying on spirit of the June 15 Declaration (between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong Il, 2000) and October 4 Declaration (between Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Jong, 2007); 2. Guarantee of the security of the North Korean system and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; 3. Conclusion of a peace treaty; 4. New economic map of Korea; 5. non-political exchange programs.

- 4 proposals: 1. Divided families meetings; 2. Holding the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics as a ‘peace Olympics’ (with North participation); 3. Stop to policies of hostility; 4. North-South dialogue, including a summit

July 17, 2017, Proposal for military talks: Proposal to hold military talks with the goal of ‘stopping hostilities at the Military Demarcation Line (MDL)’

- Evaluation

 - Joint statement following the US-ROK Summit is more forward-looking than the joint statement that came out of the Roh Mu-hyun – Bush Summit

 - Berlin Peace Initiative is more forward-looking than Kim Dae-jung’s Berlin Declaration

- North Korean statement (6 July 2017) and Kim Jong-un speech (6 July 2017)

**9. North Korea’s position**

- The reason for developing nuclear weapons is “To establish a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and achieve denuclearization of the entire Peninsula.”

- North Korea’s 5 Conditions for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

 - Start with disclosure of all nuclear weapons in South Korea

 - Abolish all nuclear weapons and bases in South Korea and provide verification

 - Guarantee that the United States will not deploy means of nuclear attack.

 - Remove threat of nuclear attack. Commitment that the U.S. will not use nuclear weapons

 - Announcement of plans for withdrawal of US troops stationed in South Korea

- July 5, 2017, Kim Jung-un’s statement

“There is no way we will put our nuclear weapons and ballistic rockets on the bargaining table unless the United States completely repeals its hostile policy and nuclear threat towards North Korea.”