Petition to Protect Workers from FLRA Abandonment

Federal Labor Relations Authority

The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) is the labor board that oversees the interactions between organized labor unions and most of the agencies in the U.S. Federal Government. Currently, the FLRA is taking the following actions that result in large-scale abandonment of federal workers:

  • "Blocking" unfair labor practice charges, petitions for elections to recognize new unions, challenges to agency "disapprovals" of locally-bargained agreements, and more – a refusal to process these cases due to the Executive Orders that claim to strip millions of federal workers of their union rights. This refusal to process has persisted even when unions have active court orders that establish that an Executive Order is unlawful as applied to them.
  • Permanently closing the FLRA's Chicago Regional Office, Office of Administrative Law Judges, and Collaboration and Alternative Dispute Resolution Office; and revoking the ability of the FLRA Regional Directors to make decisions about when elections are held by the FLRA to recognize new unions. The FLRA claims these changes are necessary due to another Executive Order, but did not conduct any public notice or opportunity to comment as required by the Administrative Procedure Act.
  • Substantially slowing resolution of cases before the FLRA members. Despite having a quorum of two out of three members, the FLRA has issued only 24 decisions in 2025. This is compared to 56 in 2024, and 77 in 2023.
  • Vacancy impacts (the fault of the President and Senate, not the FLRA): In the federal sector, the parties cannot resort to "self-help" like strikes or lockouts, and so a binding decision of the Federal Service Impasses Panel can resolve the issue. However, there are zero members of the FSIP, so all FSIP cases sit without resolution. Further, there has not been a General Counsel of the FLRA since 2017 – over eight years of inability to issue unfair labor practice complaints against agencies who have broken the law.

One overarching thread among all of these problems is that they all deprive federal workers of the ability to remedy problems when they arise in the workplace – and critically, the FLRA stands between federal workers and their ability to seek redress in the federal courts. The government has repeatedly made this argument in court this year – the so-called "channeling" argument.

To resolve these problems, we are petitioning the FLRA to amend its regulations to allow parties to cases affected by these delays, refusals to act, and vacancies, to continue along in seeking redress from the federal courts. This petition is brought under the FLRA's regulation in 5 CFR 2429.28, as well as statute in 5 U.S.C. § 553 (e) – the Administrative Procedure Act. All signers of this petition who are "interested parties" – such as federal-sector unions, federal workers, and other individuals and organizations that have a connection to federal-sector labor-management relations, will be added as parties when the petition is submitted to the FLRA.

Sponsored by
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IFPTE Local 777

To: Federal Labor Relations Authority
From: [Your Name]

We are respectfully requesting the Authority consider amending its regulations regarding processing of actions during presidential assertions of exclusions from the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FLSMRS). This request is filed pursuant to 5 CFR 2429.28, as well as the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e).

«Insert description of the signatory parties here. For example: Local 777 of the International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers (IFPTE), AFL-CIO, is the exclusive representative of a bargaining unit of federal employees at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), and the designated representative of two additional USACE bargaining units for whom IFPTE is the exclusive representative.»

The FSLMRS provides that the President of the United States may exclude “any agency or subdivision thereof” from the FSLMRS under certain conditions. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(b). This provision has been invoked recently; including through Executive Orders 14,251 and 14,353. In response to these exclusion assertions, several unions have challenged the executive order(s) in court. See, for example, Nat’l Treas. Emps. Union v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-00935-PLF (D.D.C. 2025), 25-5157 (D.C. Cir. 2025), Am. Fed’n. of Gov’t. Emps. v. Trump, No. 3:25-cv-03070-JD (N.D. Cal. 2025), 25-4014 (9th Cir. 2025), Am. Fed’n of Lab. and Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-02445-PLF (D.D.C. 2025).

Given this ongoing litigation, the Authority has been cautious to address its jurisdiction in matters related to the agencies affected by the exclusions. See, for example, Int’l Fed’n of Prof. and Tech. Eng’rs Local 777 and U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs. Chicago Dist. No. CH-CA-25-0202 (FLRA Chicago Reg. 2025) (“blocking” letter issued “defer[ing]” processing), Int’l Fed’n of Prof. and Tech. Eng’rs Local 777 and U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs. Chicago Dist. No. 0-NG-3742 (FLRA 2025) (order placing the case in abeyance), Int’l Fed’n of Prof. and Tech. Eng’rs Local 97 and U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs. Portland Dist. No. SF-RP-25-0016 (FLRA San Fran. Reg. 2025) (informal communications indicating that processing the petition for election was “blocked” due to Executive Order 14,251).

These decisions to defer processing or consideration of what seems to be all cases involving allegedly-excluded agencies are not clearly final orders of the Authority (or its Regional Directors) that would allow parties to file appeals within the Authority such as applications for review of a representation petition under 5 CFR 2422.31, appeals to the General Counsel in an unfair labor practice case under 5 CFR 2423.11(c), or exceptions to administrative law judge’s decisions pursuant to 5 CFR 2423.40; or to seek judicial review pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7123. Parties – typically, unions – may be stuck with a status quo they believe is unlawful or otherwise intolerable for an unknown duration; with no ability to address the harms in the meantime.

For example, in blocked representation cases where workers seek an election, they are indefinitely deprived of the rights that would immediately accrue from winning an election (such as Weingarten rights, notice and opportunity to bargain on changes in working conditions, etc.). In a blocked negotiability case, especially as regards provisions of executed agreements disapproved by an agency head, the union (and the activity at the level of exclusive recognition) is indefinitely deprived of the benefits it bargained for. In blocked unfair labor practice charge cases, the parties are indefinitely deprived of the likelihood of informal resolution of the charge that often arises during the investigation conducted by Authority staff or access to appropriate temporary relief, either of which could result in the cessation of the allegedly unlawful conduct.

Simply blocking cases involving allegedly-excluded parties results in generally the same results as if the Authority were to default to presuming the validity of the exclusion; but does so in a posture that denies the adversely-affected party the ability to challenge the EO facially or as applied to the parties or to the matter before the Authority. This is doubly true if the position the Government has advanced in multiple filings is adopted, which is that unions must exhaust the remedies before the Authority before pursuing judicial review. In this manner, it is critical that the Authority establish a pathway for affected parties to advance their dispute through the Authority’s processes to be able to obtain meaningful judicial review.

While the Authority might prefer to avoid committing resources to processing cases just to have outcomes rendered obsolete by litigation; this must be balanced against the parties’ need to have workplace disagreements settled efficiently. Simply put, Congress did not intend for the Authority to indiscriminately block cases just because there is a legal cloud over an issue. We concede that there will be times where all parties would rather wait to see how the litigation unfolds; but in the instances where a party feels the need to take a more aggressive posture, the Authority should not foreclose that option without providing an avenue for redress.

Proposed Regulatory Text:

PART 2429—MISCELLANEOUS AND GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
Subpart A—Miscellaneous
* * *
§ 2429.11 Interlocutory appeals.
Except as set forth in part 2423 or in section 2429.20 of this part, the Authority and the General Counsel ordinarily will not consider interlocutory appeals.
* * *
§ 2429.20 Actions involving parties affected by exclusions under litigation.

(a) This section applies whenever the President excludes an agency or agency subdivision from the provisions of chapter 71 of title 5 of the United States Code pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7103(b), and there is pending litigation in the courts of the United States as to the validity of said exclusion that applies to one or more of the parties in any matter arising pursuant to parts 2422 through 2426 of this subchapter.

(b) In any matter meeting the conditions in paragraph (a) of this section, the Authority, the General Counsel, any Administrative Law Judge appointed by the Authority under 5 U.S.C. 3105, and any Regional Director, or Hearing Officer may place the matter in abeyance pending disposition of the litigation challenging the applicable exclusion.

(c) In matters placed in abeyance pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, any party may file a request with the Authority:

(1) To grant a temporary order ordering the parties to maintain the status quo ante, or for specific performance of the terms of an executed contract, or other appropriate equitable remedy pending the ultimate resolution of the matter, or

(2) To render an immediate decision on the Authority’s jurisdiction over the matter after obtaining the views of the parties and other interested persons, orally or in writing, as the Authority deems necessary and appropriate. Such decision shall order dismissal of the matter or resumption of proceedings and shall be a final order of the Authority.

(d) If the Authority does not render a decision upon a request made pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section within 180 days of its filing, the request is constructively denied which shall be a final decision of the Authority, and the Authority shall publish confirmation thereof.